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The More it’s Centralized, the More it’s Divided: A Historical-Institutionalist 
Reading of Qatar’s Foreign Aid Landscape
Martin Lestra
Aid fragmentation is one of the recurrent features of development studies. In this 
contribution I try to understand why a small, cohesive state like Qatar, has produced so 
many different aid actors. Conventional views of Qatar’s donorship – the ‘branding’ and 
‘emerging donors’ scholarship – examine Qatar’s behaviour in multilateral arenas and 
recipient countries before drawing conclusions as to the nature of Qatar as an international 
donor. Both accounts assume an autonomous, concerted and empowered leadership in 
the small autocratic peninsula. This contribution questions this assumption. It provides 
an alternative domestic explanation based on a dynamic historical-institutionalist reading 
of Qatar’s aid bureaucracy. It argues that the increasing concentration of power in Qatar 
in the hands of the ruling family has not precluded the fragmentation of the aid landscape 
and the proliferation of aid actors. As the Qatari rentier state has developed, it has become 
increasingly difficult for the leadership to reengineer an increasingly heavier bureaucracy. 
Parallel initiatives and ‘turf wars’ for control over the aid portfolio lead to duplications, 
incomplete reforms and ultimately, to the enduring coexistence of different organizations 
and aid cultures within the petro-monarchy. 1
Introduction: ‘the new kid in the block’
Qatar is one of the smallest and most generous states in the world. Upon arriving in 
Doha in January 2016, I knew about some of its recent, rich and complex history as an 
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aid donor. Evidently, the Islamic notions of zakat,2 sadaqat,3 or waqf 4 were not wholly 
lost on me. Neither was Qatar’s success story: once one of the poorest regions on the 
globe, it had become one of most generous and visible ‘emerging donors’ 5- the ‘new 
kid in the block.’6  Its aid spanned various continents. An Arab donor, it engaged mainly 
through regional organizations like the Islamic Development Bank, and disbursed aid 
mainly within its region – to Syria, Morocco, Palestine, Egypt and Yemen.7 Yet Qatar 
was increasingly surprising the aid community by spear-heading aid initiatives towards 
developed, Western countries, such as with the Qatar Friendship Fund–Japan, to support 
relief efforts after the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan, or the 2005 Qatari Katrina 
Fund, to support victims of the hurricane in the United States.
 Qatar foreign aid was also charismatically represented by royal personalities 
such as Sheikha Moza, who had most strikingly taken special leadership in the promotion 
of education throughout the world.8 I also became aware of the importance of foreign 
aid in Qatar’s foreign policy. Emblematically, a few days after my arrival, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ Assistant for International Cooperation became the new Foreign 
Minister.9
2 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. ‘An act of social solidarity and an affirmation of faith’, it is considered a 
compulsory contribution to the poor (Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, Charitable Crescent: Politics 
of Aid in the Muslim World (I.B.Tauris, 2003, 26)). In practice this is never automatic; the categories of zakat-eligible 
recipients, or the way to calculate zakat are relatively contingent. For a historical perspective on zakat, see Benthall 
and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, first chapter.
3 As opposed to the compulsory nature of zakat, a voluntary redistribution to the poor.
4 Religious endowments in Islam: the dedication of material resources (mostly infrastructure) for charitable means. 
A private initiative progressively taken over by central administrations of the state as of the rule of Sultan Mahmud 
II (1808-1839) William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th Edition, 5th 
edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012, 73).
5 Randeep Ramesh, ‘Charitable Giving by Country: Who Is the Most Generous?,’ The Guardian, September 8, 2010, 
accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/sep/08/charitable-giving-country.
6 Western donors were not always so keen on discussing aid with Gulf donors. Until the recent financial 
crisis, Western donors showed little interest in Gulf states’ aid programs. Observers of the note the feeling of 
embarrassment described by a former Development Assistance Committee Chair when observing that members’ 
representatives ‘had little knowledge of Arab aid programmes’, and were ‘not in position to put precise questions 
to the Arabs’, at the meetings, causing disappointment on the part of Arab participants. Embarrassment went 
crescendo when Western representatives decided not to show up at all to these meetings. Peter Carroll and William 
Hynes, ‘Engaging with Arab aid donors: the DAC experience’, IIIS Discussion Paper 424, April 2013, www.tcd.ie/iiis/
documents/ discussion/pdfs/iiisdp424.pdf, 12’.
7 ‘Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD,’ accessed October 
5, 2016, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/qatar-participant-dac.htm.
8 Sean Coughlan, ‘Sheikha Moza: The Power behind Qatar’s Global Lessons,’ BBC News, accessed February 15, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29997174.
9 This nomination might be introducing an informal yet enduring practice: the former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, now Minister for Defense, was himself Assistant for International Cooperation beforehand. As reminded 
by an advisor to the Government of Qatar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ranks 4th in order of importance in the 
ministerial hierarchy. Advisor, Qatar Development Fund. Interview by author. Doha, February 17, 2016.
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 Less visible at first sight, and striking to me, was the fragmentation of the Qatari 
aid landscape. Though Qatar’s aid actors emerged for the most part in the 2000’s,10 it 
had as many, if not more, entities dealing with foreign aid than in the neighbouring, 
older aid champion, Kuwait11  It also had more state-sponsored philanthropies operating 
internationally than the United Arab Emirates – though the latter’s population exceeds 
that of Qatar threefold.12  Striking was the fact that different sources in Qatar did not even 
seem to agree on the number of Qatari aid organizations operating internationally13: 
were they nine14 or fourteen?15
 At any rate, the different Qatari charities seemed to be working in parallel, 
sometimes fulfilling very similar tasks. This surely ran counter to international 
organizations’ recommended practice of limiting aid fragmentation and avoiding 
duplications. Some of my interlocutors recognized that working with the Qatari donor 
was ‘honestly a nightmare’ difficult because ‘it is impossible to know…if all these partners 
will still exist or not in the near future!’ 16   More strikingly, fragmentation ran counter 
to the Emir’s 2002 policy establishing the Qatar Development Fund, a government 
entity meant to centralize and strategically deploy Qatar’s foreign aid. In 2016, the Qatar 
Development Fund was still being structured and various aid organizations continued 
10 Abdul Fatah S. Mohamed, ‘The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) from Commencement to 
Dissolution (2005-2009),’ in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond, ed. Jonathan 
Benthall et al. (Gerlach Press, 2014)
11 The Kuwaiti government records 9 Kuwait-based charities, while these are at least 14 in Qatar: ‘Charity In 
Kuwait,’ accessed January 7, 2017, https://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/Pages/CitizensResidents/IslamicServices/
InfoCharity.aspx.
12 This is based on a comparison between the number of charities operating on behalf of the UAE and Qatar. I 
reproduced the selection criteria set by Ridge and Kippels (2016). They find 11 state-sponsored philanthropies in the 
UAE, of which three only have international activities (Dubai Cares, the Mohamed Bin Zayed Species Conservation 
Fund and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. The recent UAE Water Foundation must be added to this list. 
Applying the same criteria to Qatari aid, I identify 6 organizations: the Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation 
for Humanitarian Services (RAF Foundation), Sheikh Eid Bin Mohamed al-Thani Charitable Foundation, Qatar 
Foundation, Qatar Development Fund, Qatar Friendship Fund and Qatar Katrina Fund - Natasha Ridge and Susan 
Kippels, “What is the Status of State-funded Philanthropy in the United Arab Emirates?”, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al 
Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research, Policy Paper no. 15, 2016, 4.
15, 2016, 4). I find, in Qatar, 9 such state-sponsored philanthropies.
13 By Qatari aid organizations dealing with foreign aid I imply that activities must take place abroad. This excludes 
organizations that are pursuing only domestic-oriented activities in Qatar, such as the Qatar Society for the 
Rehabilitation of Special Needs for instance. Morevoer, the line between the public and private is very thin in Qatar. 
As such, save for those who volunteer for charitable organizations, I would consider, as Khaled Al Mezaini does 
in the case of the UAE, that what observers call ‘nongovernmental actors’ are in fact more alike to para-public, 
parastatal actors, also known as Government Non-Governmental Organizations. See Khalid S. Almezaini, The UAE 
and Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid, Identities and Interests (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 
127.
14 Homi Kharas, ‘Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid’, Silatech Working Paper, 2015, http://www.silatech.com/
docs/defaultsource/publications-documents/trends-and-issues-in-qatari-foreign-aid-en.pdf?sfvrsn=8.
15 ‘lncrease and develop awareness of charity work within the community’, Regulatory Authority for Charitable 
Activities, 2016.
16 Official, UNESCO. Interview by author. Doha, February 25, 2016.
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to register with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Last but not least, there was 
also great variation in the line of work and the aid model of the different organizations I 
observed – from traditional Islamic charities to professionalized and ‘Westernized’ Qatar 
Foundation affiliates. This eclectic ensemble was quite puzzling given how uniquely 
cohesive Qatari society is, even by Gulf standards.17
 In short, if previous contributions usually depict Qatar as an Arab donor18 
opening to the West, the unnatural fragmentation of Qatar’s domestic aid landscape, 
despite Qatari social cohesiveness and the clear streamlining policy dictated by its 
autocratic rulers, remains to be explained.
Fragmentation’s three faces
Fragmentation is one of foreign aid’s old hats, referring to the dispersion of aid, and is 
measured from donors’ and recipients’ perspectives. The latter viewpoint examines the 
number of donors, sectors and projects implemented in recipient countries, and the 
extent to which recipient country administrations are able to cope with different aid 
flows. From a donor’s perspective, fragmentation occurs through donor proliferation, 
measured in the number of sectors or countries where the donor is disbursing aid. 
Donor proliferation is considered as hindering aid efficiency, because it is assumed 
that the more dispersed the aid the donor provides is, the less likely the donor will act 
efficiently.19 Yet fragmentation experts seem to overlook one related aspect of donor 
proliferation: donor proliferation within the state. If a donor works in one country with, 
five, ten, or twenty different national organizations, or in one sector with five, ten, or 
twenty organizations, it also participates in donor proliferation.20
 In international fora, there is strong impetus towards enhancing aid cohesion 
for greater effectiveness. Particularly targeted by these policy recommendations are 
emerging donors, like Qatar. Numerous accounts have contrasted Qatari and Arab 
donor aid standards with those of leading bilateral and multilateral donors. They tend 
to be critical and are epitomized in the opinion formulated in 1984 by an official of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, for whom ‘either Arab 
aid agencies do not know themselves how much finance they provide or (…) their 
monitoring agencies are incompetent.’21
17 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,’ Middle East Policy 21, no. 3 
(2014): 84–94.
18 Ahmed Kanna, Dubai, the City as Corporation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 144.
19 Urs Bürcky, ‘Trends in In-country Aid Fragmentation and Donor Proliferation An Analysis of Changes in Aid 
Allocation Patterns between 2005 and 2009’, Report on behalf of the OECD Task Team on Division of Labour and 
Complementarity, 2011.
20 This of course also has negative consequences from the viewpoint of the recipient country, which I leave aside in 
this contribution.
21 Carroll and Hynes, op. cit., 10
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 In Qatar, fragmentation comes under three different forms.
 Legal exemption 
 Aid organizations in Qatar do not work under a singular legal structure. Most  
 organizations fall under state regulations: they are subject to oversight from  
 Qatar’s Regulatory Authority for Charitable Affairs. Others, like the Qatar  
 Foundation and its aid affiliates (Reach Out To Asia, Silatech and Education  
 Above All) enjoy a special legal status.22 Being set up by a royal family   
 member, they ‘resort to special Emiri decrees to ensure [their] independence’  
 as well as ‘the international nature of [their] operations.’23 They can act   
 without  oversight beyond that of their alta mater.24
 The financial dimension
 Lack of transparent data cannot obscure the enormous differences in wealth  
 amongst different organizations. Four organizations dominate the scene and  
 capture most of government funding (Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent,  
 Foundation Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian   
 Services, and Sheikh Eid Foundation). One expert differentiated Reach Out  
 To Asia from Education Above All, as ‘comparing a giant and a dwarf.’ 25
 The policy dimension
 In Qatar a wide spectrum of ‘aid cultures’26 exists. Schematically, we can   
 identify two generations of aid organizations in Qatar between  1978 and  
 2016. Most first-generation Islamic charities in Qatar adopted a ‘sacralised  
 conception of aid.’ Qatar Charity, established as early as 1978, or other   
 foundations built on the Islamic concept of the waqf, such as the   
 Eid Foundation embody this trend. Newer entities, while not secular,   
 have a more professional and specialized approach to  aid. Qatar Foundation’s  
 Education Above All for instance, claims more than a billion beneficiaries and  
 works exclusively on education enrolment – a focus one of its employees  
 considers remarkable within the Qatari aid landscape.27  The rules that these 
 aid organizations follow (degree of compliance with sharia law), their objectives, 
 the way they conceptualize their aid work (charity or long-term programming), 
22 Advisor, Education Above All, Qatar Foundation. Interview by author. Doha, February 24, 2016.
23 Khalaf, ‘The State of Qatar,’ 160.
24 Mohamed, ‘The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities’, 263.
25 Advisor, Education Above All, Qatar Foundation. Interview by author. Doha, February 24, 2016.
26 Marie Juul Petersen, ‘Sacralized or Secularized Aid? Positioning Gulf-based Muslim Charities,’ ,’ in Gulf Charities 
and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond, ed. Jonathan Benthall et al. (Gerlach Press, 2014), 26.
27 Advisor, Education Above All, Qatar Foundation. Interview by author. Doha, February 24, 2016.
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 vary significantly (see Table 1). The two generations share little, if any,   
 information amongst themselves and with international organizations.28 If  
 punctual activities are organized horizontally (such as the partnership   
 between  Qatar Foundation’s Silatech and one of the ‘first-generation’ Qatar  
 Charity),29 this is rather the exception than the rule.  For instance, while the  
 different organizations working under Qatar Foundation’s umbrella   
 share information internally, in a bid for more complementarity,   
 information often is not diffused outside of the foundation. Thus   
 international organization  representatives in Qatar claim to have little   
 knowledge of what Qatar Foundation is doing.30
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28 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Library, 2010).
29 ‘Silatech, Qatar Charity Partner to Support Youth Development,’ accessed January 6, 2017, http://www.silatech.
com/en/mediacenter/
news-details/2013/09/05/silatech-qatar-charity-partner-to-support-youth-development.
30 Official, UNESCO. Interview by author. Doha, February 25, 2016.
31 Mahi Khalaf, ‘The State of Qatar,’ in From Charity to Social Change: Trends in Arab Philanthropy, ed. Ibrahim et 
al.(American Univ in Cairo Press, 2008), 160.
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Literature review
Despite the extensive literature dedicated to the foreign aid of Arab Gulf states,32 scholars 
have only paid lip-service to the domestic formulation of these aid programs.33 On the one 
hand, area-specialists have characterized Qatar’s newsworthy activities in aid (or sports, 
or culture, etc.) as national ‘branding.’34  Branding, a subset of the small states literature, 
explores small states’ repertoire when building alliances. Branding scholars show that 
by establishing a credible reputation in the production of a specific common good – 
environment, culture, humanitarianism – small states reach an international audience, 
resist the soft power of overbearing neighbours,35 assert their credibility as independent 
sheikhdoms,36 and ultimately, co-opt allies.37 In a ‘branding approach’, therefore, Qatar 
has little interest in the nitty-gritty aspects of donor proliferation and international 
cooperation. Importantly, however, branding scholars assume that states engaged in 
such strategies are characterized, unlike the ‘bloated and ossified bureaucratic structures 
of Cairo and Riyadh’, by a narrow circle of highly autonomous decision-makers38 and the 
capacity to personalize their projects.39 In other words, the rulers rule and shape their 
foreign policy accordingly. 
 On the other hand, more lenient observers of the emerging donors strand 
of literature;40 fuelled by the literature on the socializing dimension of international 
organizations,41 consider Qatar’s aid to be moving in the right direction. Has a leading aid 
32 Al Mezaini; 2010; Neumayer, 2003; Villanger 2007; Barakat and Zyck, 2010; Tok 2015; Lestra and Tok 
forthcoming).
33 On domestic accounts of Qatar’s foreign aid landscape and other Gulf donors, see Khali Al Mezaini's forthcoming 
book: Politics of Aid: Foreign Aid Programs of the Arab Gulf State.
34 J. E. Peterson, ‘Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State,’ Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (October 1, 2006): 
732–48.
35 Alexandre Kazerouni, ‘Musées et soft power dans le Golfe persique,’ Pouvoirs 152, no. 1 (December 2, 2014): 
87–97.
36 John Duke Anthony and Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buhūth al-Istirātījīyah, The United Arab Emirates: 
Dynamics of State Formation (Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2002); James 
M. Dorsey, ‘The 2022 World Cup: A Potential Monkey Wrench for Change,’ The International Journal of the History 
of Sport 31, no. 14 (September 22, 2014): 1739–54; Allen James Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2012).
37 Investing in some global good is one pathway. The two others are according to Peterson, accommodating 
powerful neighbours and having a powerful protector. Peterson, in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab 
Spring (Oxford; New York: C Hurst & Co, 2014), 41.
38 Peterson, in ibid., 40; Mari Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of 
Natural Unsustainability (Oxford University Press, 2014), 25, http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.eui.eu/
view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199387526.001.0001/acprof-9780199387526.
39 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Gulf States in International Political Economy (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 
76–77.
40 Homi Kharas, ‘Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid’; M. Evren Tok, ‘Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda: 
Towards a Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation,’ November 1, 2015, http://collections.unu.edu/view/
UNU:3322.
41 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,’ International Studies Quarterly 
45, no. 4 (2001): 487–515.
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organization – the OECD – not welcomed in April 2016 Qatar as a participant in its aid 
organ, the Development Assistance Committee? 42 These scholars are joined by forward-
looking policy-makers. ‘After the expansion phase there is the phase of rationalization’ 
a foreign aid official in Doha explained to me,43 echoing the observation of an aid 
expert: ‘there is learning pattern amongst Gulf states that also pushes for fragmentation. 
Indeed, individuals are more and more aware, savvy and competent to reform existing 
organizations; henceforth, they are able to develop new organizations that are more up 
to standards.’ 44
 Both of these views have strong limitations. The ‘branding-emerging donor’ 
nexus efficiently underlines donor proliferation’s roots in Qatar’s hydrocarbon wealth in 
the past decade; as well as the capacity of the leadership to mobilize in a very short span 
of time resources for specific projects, regardless of domestic or international constraints. 
Branding advocates, however, tend to misrepresent wealthy petro-monarchies as states 
that ‘throw money at problems.’ 45 This claim overlooks the great self-understanding in 
Qatar, as in other small states, of the limited availability of human resources that cannot 
be diluted into short-term, dispersed initiatives. The emirate has strongly advocated 
since 2011, at the level of the regional Gulf Cooperation Council, for the creation of a 
Gulf Development Fund to ease the burden of its limited human resources.46  Nor can 
‘branding’ explain why aid organizations continue to mushroom in Qatar regardless of 
attempts by the leadership itself to streamline Qatari aid, since the 2002 Emiri Decree 
for the establishment of Qatar Development Fund. Either leaders show little care for the 
state’s reputation among international organizations – disregarding reputational gains – 
and contradicting branding. This is the position of numerous scholars that have criticized 
the politicization of aid in the Gulf, again during the recent Arab spring47 and of failing 
to abide by transparency and accountability standards of the international development 
community.48  Rather, as will be argued, Qatar’s leadership is indeed concerned with 
reputational gains, but does not act in the autonomous way branding scholars deem 
characteristic of small autocratic states.  
 Other accounts have with reason pointed to the country’s positive learning 
curve. In this view, ‘branding’ is a transitional phase in Qatar’s development, rather than 
42 ‘Qatar Becomes Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD.’
43 Advisor, Qatar Development Fund. Interview by author. Doha, February 17, 2016.
44 Aid expert, School of Foreign Service-Georgetown University. Interview Doha, February 4, 2016.
45 Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change.
46 Official, Gulf Cooperation Council. Interview by author. Doha, February 11, 2016.
47 Régis Soubrouillard, ‘Quand le Qatar achetait la France,’ Outre-Terre n° 33-34, no. 3 (December 1, 2012): 517–21; 
Keith Johnson, ‘Royals Flush?,’ Foreign Policy, October 28, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/28/
royals_flush_oil_prices_saudis_UAE_egypt_jordan?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utmterm
=Flashpoints&utm_campaign=2014_FlashPoints10%2F28RS.
48 Espen Villanger, ‘Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives,’ Forum for Development 
Studies 34, no.2 (2007): 223–256.
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a permanent characteristic of its foreign policy. This is a valuable reminder of an often 
overlooked fact: Qatar, in spite of its wealth, is a ‘state in the making.’49  Where these 
indulgent accounts are mistaken is to think of Qatar as of any other emerging donor. 
Several indicators point to the specificity of donor proliferation in Qatar. 
 A youthful donor like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates have developed in 
2008 and in 2013 a more consolidated and centralized aid strategy under the (then) 
Ministry of International Cooperation and Development.50 Other emerging donors 
are also moving towards more centralization, albeit with bureaucratic hiccups. For 
instance, an incomparably bigger bureaucracy, India, has managed to give the lead to its 
Ministry of External Affairs in defining and disbursing aid programs.51 Notwithstanding 
international comparisons, donor proliferation in Qatar seems enduring rather than 
temporary. As the manager of a major Qatar charity indicated to me, there was no 
sign that duplications between the major Qatari providers of aid - Qatar Charity, the 
Foundation Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services, and the 
Sheikh Eid Foundation, were to cease! 52 These facts cast doubt on the learning curve as 
a full-fledged explanation for this persistent proliferation.
49 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History.
50 These functions have been further centralized with the incorporation of these tasks within a newly defined UAE 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in 2016.
51 Subhash Agrawal, ‘Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The India Case’, IDRC-CRDI, 2007, 
https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/sp/Documents%20EN/Case-of-India.pdf, 5.
52 Ali Bin Abdullah Al Suwaidi, Director General, Sheikh Eid Bin Mohamed al-Thani Charitable Foundation. 
Interview by author. Doha, February 21, 2016.
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Qatar aid landscape 1974-2016 (compiled by author, various sources)
Theoretical argument: how the growing rentier state leads to donor proliferation 
in Qatar
Hydrocarbons have made many things possible in Qatar. Thanks to hydrocarbons and 
an early commitment to charitable affairs,53 Qatar has become a sizeable donor, following 
the lead of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. According to the OECD (2016), Qatar’s 
reported Official Development Assistance has nearly doubled between 2011 to 2013, 
from 734 million to 1.3 billion USD.
 Numerous contributions have elaborated on the role of rent in foreign policy, 
including aid. Barakat and Zyck in particular (2013) have shown how closely correlated 
oil prices and the disbursements of aid are in the Gulf (see graph).
53 Gerd Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East (London; New York: Routledge, 1988).
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Deviation of Gulf state Official Development Assistance and crude oil price from 
39-year average (1970-2008) 54
Rent and aid are not however only linked in quantitative terms. Rentier lenses 
sometimes act as blinders: they focus on the amounts of aid. But a rentier economy 
also has bureaucratic characteristics that affect the way foreign aid is mobilized and 
disbursed. A rentier dynamic enables the proliferation of autonomous and enduring 
actors. Rent has enabled various Qatari aid actors to emerge, to proliferate, but also to 
fossilize, impervious to the rationalization of the aid landscape initiated by the country’s 
leadership (see Section 1). 
 To identify this process, I apply Steffen Hertog’s dynamic historical-
institutionalist reading of the rentier state. In Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats (2010), 
Hertog explains why the bureaucratic apparel of Saudi Arabia develops at different 
54 Sultan Barakat and Steven A. Zyck, ‘Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments,’ Monograph, July 
2010, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/kuwait/home.aspx, 318.
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speeds, why decrepit and top-notch departments coexist within the Saudi administration. 
He argues that the more the rentier state co-opts society through the rentier contract - 
notably by providing stable, well-paid public jobs - the heavier and reform-averse the 
bureaucracy becomes. As the state bureaucracy grows, the harder it becomes to ‘re-
engineer’ it. The path dependency generated by the emergence and consolidation of the 
rentier state becomes an obstacle to reform.
 How do reforms fail according to Hertog? In short, pressure to reform 
dysfunctional services is blocked at the mid-level as (1) low-tier bureaucrats are de 
facto protected by their patrons (usually eminent members of the ruling family or 
close relations). Put simply, you cannot fire a local. (2) Reforms are also blocked by the 
very vertical nature of autocratic decision-making, which impedes the circulation of 
information and the swiftness of decision-making.55 Every minor decision takes time 
because ‘it has to be validated at the very top.’ 56
 Fragmentation – or donor proliferation - is thus paradoxically a result of power 
centralization in the hands of a few. Reform is not a lost cause, but is often partial (see 
Section 2). Just as the concentration of power in few hands enables some organizations 
to resist reform, it also empowers more entrepreneurial patrons. Change may take place 
through (1) the pressure of central government, when it reassigns jurisdictions. Just as 
segmentation blocks through-and-out reforms, it deters the emergence of administrative 
coalitions promoting the status quo and facilitates the swift implementation of partial 
reforms. Reform may also result from (2) outside pressure applied by powerful allies 
and/or international organizations. Successful reforms are therefore more likely when 
the interests of the international organization and of rulers are aligned in favour of 
reforming the rentier bureaucracy (see Section 3).57
 At the end of the day, those who decide to reform and those who decide to 
linger on to their bureaucratic fiefdoms, increasingly segment the bureaucracy. In the aid 
landscape, this allows for the indifferent coexistence of different, and often redundant, 
organizations.58
 This contribution applies Hertog’s framework to a more unlikely case than his 
Saudi experience. Indeed, it examines foreign aid as (1) a sub-category of foreign policy. 
Foreign policy is an issue-area in which executive control is presumed to be stronger 
than in any other domains (par the competences of the central bank and the ministry of 
interior) and hence fragmentation less likely to be found. Qatar is also a crucial case (2) 
because its bureaucracy being much smaller than Saudi Arabia’s, it is presumably easier 
to reform. This essay thus tests whether Hertog’s predictions hold in a smaller arena on 
a sensitive issue-area.
55 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.
56 Official, Delegation of the European Union to the United Arab Emirates. Interview by author. Abu Dhabi, October 
29, 2015.




Central to the historical-institutionalist angle I adopt in this essay is the notion of path 
dependency. In order to understand how things work and fail today in Qatar’s foreign aid 
landscape, one must pay close attention to its inherited institutional aid designs and how 
these have been impacted by the development of the Qatari rentier state. How did the aid 
landscape emerge in Qatar? To what extent has it been reformed or left unchanged as the 
rentier bureaucracy has grown in Qatar ?
 In this essay, I provide the context of the emergence of aid actors in Qatar and 
how the growth of the rentier state in Qatar has enhanced donor proliferation (Section 
1). I then build on these preliminary findings to show how state-led reform to centralize 
and rationalize the Qatari aid community, with the Qatar Development Fund, has had 
limited effects (Section 2). Last, I illustrate, how in line with the rentier logic, the aligned 
interests of Qatar’s leadership and international demand in the tense context of the War 
on Terror, has had only limited impact on Qatar’s foreign aid landscape (Section 3).
 In this work, I trace the evolution of Qatar’s aid landscape over time, and 
in particular from 2002 to 2016. I work with 35 elite interviews conducted in Qatar 
between January and February 2016 with all relevant policy-makers – ministries, 
charities, foundations, foreign diplomats, representatives of international organizations 
and academics; and at the OECD in December 2016. This corpus is also informed by 30 
other interviews conducted in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in late 2015-early 2016. In addition, 
I use archival sources and secondary literature.
Section 1: How donor proliferation developed in Qatar
Let us recall a well-known yet often dismissed fact about Qatar: it is a developing state-
in-the-making. Aid pre-dates the Qatari state, and consequently, the Qatari rentier state.
 Charity in Qatar was first charity given to Qatar by its neighbours before its 
independence. If Qatar experiences double-digit growth rates today and appears among 
the richest nations in the world,59  it has nonetheless known bitter times. Historians have 
largely documented how the merchant economies of the Gulf in the early 20th century, 
based in great part on the pearling industry, were immensely affected in the 1940s by 
the Second World War’s disruption of trade in the region and Japanese competition.60 
Situations of economic frailty were such that Qatar was then one of the poorest and 
famished places on the globe. Thus, before becoming a donor, Qatar was a recipient of 
aid embroiled in regional politics. Qatar was assisted by Kuwait in particular, whose first 
recorded aid was provided ‘for the financing of teachers and construction of schools’ 
59 Raphael A. Espinoza, The Macroeconomics of the Arab States of the Gulf, First edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 18. 
60 Fromherz, Qatar A Modern History; Guillemette Crouzet, Genèses Du Moyen-Orient: Le Golfe Persique À L’âge 
Des Impérialismes: Vers 1800-Vers 1914, Époques (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2015).
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before 1953.61 Regionalism continued to dominate after Qatar’s independence and 
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. Thus, despite the relative domestic leeway to 
engage in a ‘branding’ behaviour with global reach, Qatari state-sponsored aid institutions 
did not emerge after 1971. Rather, Qatari aid was shaped by and embedded in regional 
politics. Qatar participated, albeit discreetly, alongside other Gulf and Arab states, in 
establishing various aid-oriented organizations. In the course of three years (1974-
1976) for instance, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Islamic 
Development Bank and the OPEC Fund for International Development flourished.62 
Needless to say that Saudi Arabia dominated – and dominates – these arenas. Second-
gun Qatar was known to be ‘invisible and quiet’ and aligned with its bigger neighbours.63 
Qatar was essentially a financial contributor, rather than a full-fledged actor. In practice, 
the only state administration reinforced in this phase was Qatar’s Ministry of Finance. As 
in most of its khaleeji counterparts, it was the designated interlocutor in these regional 
aid institutions.
 Aid in Qatar also pre-dates the rentier state. There were already mentions of 
forms of zakat in Qatar under the rule of the Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt.64 It may ‘be 
traced to the time prior to the discovery of oil resources, when citizens banded together 
to provide much-needed social services on an ad hoc and reactive basis’ and relied on 
‘tribal loyalties and individual acts of charity.’ 65 Charity was organized as the individual 
or group-level. Qatari aid was not, albeit being inspired by religious principles, the 
monopoly of a clear-cut clergy as in neighbouring Saudi Arabia.66 Indeed, no native 
and organized class of ulama existed in Qatar’s early days67 and Qatari leaders made 
sure that no organized foreign class of ulama would form in the midst of their nascent 
bureaucracy.68  Without any organized form of aid within the clergy or social groups, it is 
no surprise that formalized aid in Qatar was a late-comer: most professional Qatari aid 
actors, such as the Qatar Foundation, were founded after 1996.69 Conversely, the first-
generation of formalized Qatari aid actors – such as Qatar Charity (1978) or the Qatar 
Red Crescent (1982), developed around local groups of notables. 
 If the initial presence of Qatar as a state in the field of foreign aid was not 
61 Carroll and Hynes, ‘Engaging’, 4.
62 Ibid., 5.
63 Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change, 202.
64 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia (Slough: Archive Editions, 1986), vol. 2, 
95.
65 Khalaf, ‘The State of Qatar,’ 155; 149.
66 Nabil Mouline, ‘Enforcing The State's Islam: The Functioning of The Committee of Senior Scholars,’ ed. Haykel 
et al., Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 32.
67 Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, ‘Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia,’ Arab Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2011): 96–111.
68 Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood,’ 85–86.
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striking, its capacity to provide aid throughout the region – and now the world – increased 
concomitantly with the state’s capture of the hydrocarbon wealth. Qatar’s bureaucracy, 
set up by the ruling Al Thani family, progressively nationalized and formalized what was 
initially an unregulated social practice. The state established supervisory oversight over 
some of Qatar’s major aid organizations with the law 2 of 1974 (updated in 2004 and 
2014)70 under the Ministry of Civil Service and Housing Affairs. Organized religious 
practices such as the zakat or the waqf were taken up by the Qatari state in the forms of the 
Zakat Fund (2003) and the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. Recent additions have 
also attempted to consolidate an embryonic form of para-public Qatari civil society.71 
The state also progressively integrated aid as part and parcel of its foreign policy. In 2002 
the Qatar Development Fund was established. In 2008 it created a ministerial post for 
international cooperation in 2008, replaced in 2011 by the position of ‘Assistant Minister 
for International Cooperation Affairs’ within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 72
 The move towards state-organized foreign aid was not linear however. With the 
redistribution of wealth – both within the closer circle of central rulers, as well as through 
the public and para-public employment of nationals in state aid administrations and 
charities, foreign aid fiefdoms sprouted. Wealth redistribution indeed created avenues 
for the proliferation of aid actors. Many of these charities’ patrons were individuals – 
close to the royal family – who made rich thanks to the redistribution of hydrocarbon 
dividends:
 There are plenty of billionaires in Qatar who set up their own foundation… 
 only one CEO, one agent, and that’s it. 73
 
Patron support, rather than aid performance, determined these aid organizations’ 
life expectancy. Some organizations ‘die[d] out as soon as they[were] produced’. 74 
Many more remained present in the landscape despite their blatant inactivity. 75 For 
organizations that did well, the importance of patronage was also underscored. Rather 
than mentioning the results of her organization, a Silatech employee stated that ‘Silatech 
69 Mohamed, ‘The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities’, 206.
70 Khalaf, ‘The State of Qatar’, 155.
71 A recent draft law was proposed for instance to enable foreigners to take part in civil society organizations; 
‘Foreigners Can Start Institutions for Public Benefit,’ accessed February 28, 2016, http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/
news/qatar/371911/foreignerscan-start-institutions-for-public-benefit.
72 ‘International Cooperation, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/InternationalCooperation/Pages/
History.aspx.
73 Official, Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
74 Diplomat, French Embassy. Interview by author. Doha, February 10, 2016.
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is an initiative of Sheikha Moza and hence is unlikely to disappear.’ 76
 After the first-generation of charities was established, a second-generation of 
aid organizations, from the 2000’s onwards, was added to the landscape, rather than 
replacing sometimes resembling initiatives. Symbolized by the Qatar Foundation, the 
new generation pursued its reformist and ambitious aid objectives in addition to – and 
not in replacement of – the previous fossilized aid fiefdoms. This second-generation 
did not reach out to its first-generation counterparts through the mediation of state 
administrations. Rather, characteristically of the rentier dynamic at play, it bypassed the 
existing bureaucracy and laid down parallel tracks for aid management.77 Rather than 
a ‘culture of Islamic aid,’ new organizations’ approach to aid was performance-based 
and inspired by private sector methods of management.78  Rather than hiring former 
civil servants or volunteers, these second-generation charities hired smaller, cohesive 
and professionalized teams79– a feature noted by Hertog in his analysis of performing 
Saudi administrations.80 Qatar Foundation’s modus operandi illustrates this mechanism. 
Rather than drawing on state resources, Qatar Foundation hired international consulting 
companies or worked hand-in-hand with international charities to develop their 
strategies in a matter of weeks, if not days.81
 Thus, from the 1970’s to the 2000’s, the growth of the hydrocarbon rent 
favoured the dispersion of organizations of the aid sector, not unlike the Emirati or 
Saudi neighbour. All organizations adopted idiosyncratic rules: both the manager of 
a traditional charity and a Qatar Foundation pointed to the autonomy they enjoyed in 
setting their reporting rules.82 Despite their very different forms, objectives and working 
cultures, they coexisted in relative indifference. However, it became uniquely difficult 
75 Such low-profile behaviour is observable for three charities established by Ministerial decisions of 2013. The 
ATAA Charity Foundation (Said Bin Salem Al Bineid Al Muhanadi Charity Foundation); the Nasser Bin Jassem 
Althani Charity Foundation (Dar Al-ber) and the Faisal Bin Fahad Al Thani Charity Foundation have not publicized 
any of their activities since and are unknown to most aid observers. A reverse example is that of billionaire Ibrahim 
Asmakh’s Al Asmakh Charity Foundation. The charity was founded in Doha in 2011 with a paid-up capital of 
approximately $27.5 million; ‘Ibrahim Al Asmakh | Wealth-X,’ accessed January 6, 2017, http://www.wealthx.com/
articles/2015/ibrahim-al-asmakh/.
76 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History. Project Officer, Silatech. Interview by author. Doha, February 25, 2016.
77 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 268.
78 An aid worker thus considered that his employer ‘compares with a project management company if we were part 
of the private sector’ - Advisor, Education Above All, Qatar Foundation. Interview by author. Doha, February 24, 
2016.
79 Thus, while the Eid Foundation employs about 370 people, Education Above All employs about 60 people, Reach 
Out To Asia employs 50.
80 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 3.
81 Qatar Foundation’s Reach Out To Asia thus worked jointly with Mercy Corp to develop its aid model Esker 
Copeland, Youth and Education Projects, Reach Out To Asia. Interview by author. Doha, February 15, 2016. 
82 Esker Copeland, Youth and Education Projects, Reach Out To Asia. Interview by author. Doha, February 15, 
2016; Ali Bin Abdullah Al Suwaidi, Director General, Sheikh Eid Bin Mohamed al-Thani Charitable Foundation. 
Interview by author. Doha, February 21, 2016.
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for the Qatari state to re-engineer itself, as the successes and failures of the Qatar 
Development Fund (QDF) illustrate.
Section 2: Re-engineering the state: the case of Qatar Development Fund
The gradual proliferation of para-public aid fiefdoms has tested the strength of the Qatari 
state. Despite the central role of the ruling Al Thani family in making the state of Qatar 
and shaping the narratives around it,83 the aid landscape has developed, to some extent, 
out of its grasp. QDF has been only partially successful in the endeavour to rationalize 
Qatar’s aid landscape because the entrenchment of the rentier state enabled (1) reform-
adverse aid actors to resist change and (2) reform-prone actors to act regardless of QDF’s 
formal authority.
 Contrarily to assertions of some branding academics, donor proliferation is 
undoubtedly known to, and a concern for, Qatari decision-makers. A fundamental turn 
was taken as early as 2002 to counter donor proliferation with the creation of the QDF. 
The leadership stated its intention to reform the aid system into a more efficient whole. 
One high-ranking official indicated then, the need to ‘boost the ‘productivity’ of [Qatar’s] 
aid activities.’ 84 Considered as the government’s instrument, QDF was to become the 
central decision-maker and coordinator of Qatari aid. In practice, it was meant to take 
over the executive competence of the International Development Department in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and develop a strategic component for Qatari aid.85 QDF was 
also to put into place more precise aid objectives than the relatively loose framework 
of the broad Qatar National Vision 2030 policy-document86  – for instance by setting 
‘benchmarks for aid’.87
 On the whole, Qatari aid actors welcomed the QDF as an effort to enhance and 
support their work abroad. As put by a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Finance, 
‘development is old in Qatar as you know and QDF and MOFA took over foreign aid 
competences because they can do it better than we can.’88 Since its legal establishment in 
2002, however, the process of structuring of QDF has dragged its feet. In 2008, the head 
of the Emiri Diwan observed the ongoing ‘proliferation’ and ‘fragmentation’ of Qatar’s 
aid system.89 And fourteen years later, QDF’s implementation is still underway. Some 
83 Fromherz, Qatar A Modern History, 18.
84 Advisor, Qatar Development Fund. Interview by author. Doha, February 17, 2016.
85 The strategic aspect has normally been dealt with in 2015, according to one interviewee. Official, Regulatory 
Agency for Charitable Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
86 Fawzi Ouessedik, Head of International Relations, General Secretariat, Qatar Red Crescent. Interview by author. 
Doha, February 4, 2016.
87 Advisor, International Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, 
February 2, 2016.
88 Director, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Finance. Interview by author. Doha, February 24, 
2016.
89 Advisor, International Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, 
February 2, 2016.
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of its competences remain unclarified. In the words of a UN agent in February 2016, ‘I 
don’t understand who those people are, what they do, and how to situate them within 
the landscape.’90 The historical-institutionalist approach provides an explanation for this 
fundamental reform’s partial impact.
 On the one hand, QDF’s creation was swift because it added to, and did not 
supersede, existing institutions. Alike to the inception of Qatar Foundation, QDF’s 
creation symbolizes in itself the possible circumventions that the rentier dynamic 
leads to, in the name of reform, even within the state administration. Rather than 
create a full-blown ministry, or associate different ministries91 to the launching of 
the new administration, QDF was the work of a small team of professionals working 
around a powerful patron, with the approval of the Emiri Diwan; and nested within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The state again associated with external stakeholders to 
build its national instrument. For instance, consultations with the RAND corporation 
preceded the creation QDF’s alta mater, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ International 
Development Department in 2008-2009.92
 On the other hand, QDF experienced difficulty in acting on its fragmented 
environment. It emerged in the context of a state administration that was as fragmented 
as the para-public charitable sector described in Section 1.93 QDF has not to this day 
taken over all of the competences that one could expect in this move towards more 
centralized and coordinated aid in the Qatari landscape – such as the licensing of 
charities, maintained within the Ministry of Social Affairs; nor the representation of 
Qatar in important forums such as the Islamic Development Bank – a competence of 
the Ministry of Finance.94 More importantly, it remains unclear to what extent QDF will 
90 Official, UNESCO. Interview by author. Doha, February 25, 2016.
91 Such as the related administrations of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, or the Ministry of Planning and 
Development Statistics.
92 Hertog’s side-argument that reform may be facilitated by brokers, experts that circulate between different 
organizations, both private and public (Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats., 26), is illustrated here. One of the 
main figures of the IDD is himself a former employee of the RAND corporation assigned to the Qatari government 
(Advisor, International Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 
2, 2016).
93 A UN representative listed the number of its interlocutors: ‘we work with the Qatar government – and we report 
to the Ministry of Education. We also work with a national commission. (…). On top of that of course, are also 
involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anytime something has an international dimension – they have to be part 
of the process. Then you also have the Ministry of Finance and of course the Emiri Diwan.’ Official, UNESCO. 
Interview by author. Doha, February 25, 2016.
94 Director, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Finance. Interview by author. Doha, February 24, 
2016.
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exert its authority over certain actors, notably the organizations of the Qatar Foundation 
working under special Emiri decrees; or the more isolated Zakat Fund of the Ministry of 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, which save for their relationship with the Qatar Red Crescent95 
(a first-generation actor like them), do not seem to entertain working relationships with 
second-generation aid organizations96 and remain obscure even to other state officials. 97
 QDF’s partial success is in line with this contribution’s central argument. While 
‘branding’ scholars assume the all-encompassing power of the leader to implement 
policies from one day to the next, the historical-institutionalist reading of the rentier 
state underlines the obstacles to reforms that leaders are confronted with at the mid-level 
management of the bureaucracy.98 Reformers are faced with the tendency in ‘for risk-
averse bureaucrats to refer to the top and not make voluntary moves.’99 The extremely 
vertical design of organizations around patrons protects lower-level implementers from 
the leadership; and gives no incentive for employees to take risks – why should they if 
they cannot be fired by the rentier state?100 While this is true in most aid bureaucracies 
around the world,101 it translates into more extreme outcomes in rentier states like 
Qatar. As an aid expert explained, ‘the leadership cannot force unto other resourceful 
individuals any significant changes.’102
 Bureaucratic habits and fiefdoms enshrined within the state may thus obstruct 
the full-fledged role earmarked for QDF if they conflict with pre-existing interests. 
First, QDF’s mandate to represent the entire Qatari state in international fora may be 
undermined by domestic oppositions. In Qatar, the domination of regional politics 
in the early days of Qatar’s independence (see section 1) has guaranteed the Ministry 
95 Fawzi Ouessedik, Head of International Relations, General Secretariat, Qatar Red Crescent. Interview by author. 
Doha, February 4, 2016.
96 Esker Copeland, Youth and Education Projects, Reach Out To Asia. Interview by author. Doha, February 15, 2016
97 Advisor, International Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, 
February 2, 2016.
98 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 11.
99 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 24.
100 Diplomat, French Embassy. Interview by author. Doha, February 10, 2016. Readers should not be misled by 
such dramatic press articles appearing now and then. One such article asserts that since his crowning as Emir, 
‘Sheikh Tamim has [taken …] austerity measures. He has consistently stressed fiscal discipline since his first speech 
as emir, and has aggressively sought to reduce the size and reach of government. The emir has already reduced the 
number of government ministries, slashed state institutions’ budgets by up to 40%’ (Azhar Unwala is an analyst 
for government et al., ‘The Young Emir: Emir Tamim and Qatar’s Future | GRI,’ Global Risk Insights, September 
18, 2016, http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/09/emir-tamim-and-qatars-future/). In practice, no one, expect for 
expatriate workers, is fired among national public servants.
101 Bertin Martens, The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).
102 Aid expert, School of Foreign Service-Georgetown University. Interview by author by author. Doha, February 4, 
2016.
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of Finance’s stead in regional organizations - such as the Islamic Development Bank 
- to this day.103 Though not specifically mentioning Qatar, a GCC official mentioned 
Ministries of Finance’s power to oppose rulers’ will during the (failed) negotiations to 
create a Gulf Development Fund:
 You’d expect this opposition to come from the leadership – that is not the case. 
 At the strategic level, there is great consensus among regional leaders for  
 commitment to development aid in future years, as well as agreement   
 on the sectors and recipients of  such aid. The difficulty lies at the   
 administrative level, where a turf war is taking place. [Some ministries] in  
 particular are reluctant to give over oversight, when this is fundamental   
 to their competences. It’s a sovereignty issue within the state. We have   
 thus seen a Minister of Finance…walk out of a meeting without even hearing  
 other participants’ propositions.104
 Second, QDF’s domestic primus inter pares role in foreign aid – to introduce a 
strategic component in Qatar’s aid landscape – may also prove to be an illusion. Previous 
domestic episodes have that for matters pertaining to aid transparency, previous 
attempts to reform have had limited success, as state administrations have managed 
to neutralize one another.105  As noted by Qatar’s Regulatory Authority for Charitable 
Activities’ manager, ‘most aid agencies, save for some who are really results-oriented, 
are not focussing on results, but on procedures.’106 Conversely, QDF must establish some 
form of control over the results-oriented organizations that precede it, dealing with legal 
and material107 asymmetries already mentioned.
 This section underlined the value of a historical-institutionalist approach. 
Rather than considering, as branding scholars do, that Qatar’s foreign stance is as 
flexible as its checkbook is thick, I show that that there is an inherent inertia within 
the state administration itself inherited from the institutional designs of Qatar’s early 
independence days; and reinforced by the rentier state. Despite the goodwill expressed 
in the creation of the Qatar Fund for Development, the latter also succumbs to the 
rentier dynamic and participates in the fragmentation of the Qatari aid administration. 
103 Official, Gulf Cooperation Council. Interview by author. Doha, February 11, 2016.
104 I do not question here the Ministry of Finance’s competence, which is contingent upon the personnel working 
there, but rather, counterfactually, what would happen if the Ministry was not considered competent anymore. 
Official, Gulf Cooperation Council. Interview by author. Doha, February 11, 2016.
105 Advisor, Qatar Foundation. Interview by author. Doha, February 20, 2016.
106 Official, Regulatory Agency for Charitable Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
107 Qatar Foundation for instance ‘exceeds by far on the ground the delivery that [ministries] can provide!’ Advisor, 
International Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 2, 2016.
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In short, QDF works well to the extent that it adds, rather than replaces, what existed 
prior to it. The long gestation period of that organization shows that the leadership may 
find the implementation of reforms to be a tricky matter. QDF’s emergence is likely 
to somewhat curb donor proliferation, without, however, creating an integrated aid 
system. Its attempt to rationalize Qatari aid is likely to face two obstacles. While less 
efficient organizations will resist its functional approach to stamp out aid duplications 
and increase transparency, results-oriented organizations, encouraged by a favourable 
legal framework, will have little incentive to work under its authority.
Section 3: Aligned state and international interests: Qatar aid post-9/11
In the last chapter of his book, Hertog argues that the fragmented nature of the rentier 
bureaucracy favours the adoption of external reforms, if the interests of external parties 
and rulers are aligned.108 Indeed, if fragmentation blocks through-and-out reforms, it 
equally allows for very quick partial reforms when the central state power decides to 
reassign jurisdictions. Indeed, fragmented interests within the state cannot coalesce to 
form a coherent opposition to reform.
 Post-9/11, the rulers of Qatar and the international community, led by the 
United States and the United Kingdom, had ‘really a reason to cooperate.’109 Suspicions 
as to the participation of Qatari aid personalities in the financing of terrorist activities 
pushed the government to regulate more stringently the aid landscape. After 9/11, the 
law of 1974 was revised in 2004 and increased the oversight of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs over existing civil society organizations.110 Moreover, a specific agency was put 
into place in the same year to supervise any Qatari aid disbursement abroad, so as to 
track any possible financing of terrorism.111 The Qatar Authority for Charitable Affairs 
(QACA), shaped after the UK Charity Commission and with the help of an international 
development consultancy, ACME Corp.,112 was the first to scrutinize more in-depth the 
international activities of Qatari charities. Yet again, its role was not clearly delineated. 
Some of its competences overlapped with those of the Ministry of Social Affairs.113 A 
noted weakness of QACA was also the inclusion of article 24 in the Emiri decree which 
gave the Ruler the possibility to grant exemption to oversight ‘to any organization at 
any time.’114 Despite ongoing terrorism in the region and globally, QACA disappeared 
108 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 32.
109 Aid expert, School of Foreign Service-Georgetown University. Interview by author. Doha, February 4, 2016.
110 The law of 2004 states that ‘The ministry reserves the right to inspect documents and records’ (in Khalaf, ‘The 
State of Qatar,’ 155).
111 Tracking in practice is done through various means : screening of external partners; of banking through the FTS 
put into place in Paris; through the regulation of the charities that want to operate from Qatar abroad; through a 
word check with Word Check 1 by ThomsonReuters, which identifies names that could be blacklisted: International 
Monetary Fund. 2008. Qatar: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism, Country Report No. 08/322.
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in 2009. Rather than the little care that some conferred to Qatari authorities because of 
that decision,115 the Qatari state appears to have acted in the face of QACA’s poor results, 
which unequivocally laid bare its incapacity to manage the different Qatari charities. 
A leaked diplomatic cable from Secretary Hillary Clinton in 2010 termed Qatar as the 
‘worst in the region’ in terms of counterterrorism.116 Strikingly, the leadership then 
redistributed QACA’s competences to more trusted state administrations, such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 The leadership did not leave this matter at rest. Pressed by international 
partners, the Emiri Diwan issued a strategy, with the help of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and of a team of international consultants, notably Deloitte Middle East,117 to 
establish the Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities (RACA).118 This independent 
state institution, nested within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,119  has oversight 
over the creation of any private charity association that may want to raise donations and 
transfer aid abroad.120  Significantly, the state was then able, not only add to the existing, 
but also to subtract to it. In this case, it retrieved the responsibility over Qatari charities 
from the Associations Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.121 
Despite, however, the alignment of Qatar leadership’s and international stakeholders’ 
interests, reform of Qatar’s regulatory framework is again slow and partial. RACA’s task 
is limited. Legally, its mandate covers only the external activities of Qatari charities.122 
It is thus for instance impossible for its general manager to indicate how important the 
external activities of big players such as the Qatar Red Crescent activities are, compared 
to their domestic commitments.123 Legally too, RACA does not have oversight over one of 
the major actor of Qatar’s foreign aid, the Qatar Foundation. Materially, the supervisory 
work is not given the full-blow importance one would expect for such a sensitive task. 
112 ‘Welcome to Acme Strategies,’ accessed January 4, 2017, http://acmestrategies.com/site/qaca.htm.
113 Mohamed, ‘The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities,’ 266. In practice this could cause two different sets 
of problems: first, the risk of duplication, as both agents attempting to take control of oversight could possibly 
overburden charities with regulations with which they’d be forced to comply twice; or conversely, if both agents 
‘passed the buck’ to one another, creating de facto a legal loophole.
114 Christopher M. Blanchard, Qatar: Background and U. S. Relations (DIANE Publishing, 2011).
115 Matthew Levitt, ‘Qatar’s not-so-charitable record on terror finance,’ TheHill, (September 24, 2014),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/218706-qatars-not-so-charitable-record-on-terror-finance.
116 ‘Follow the Money,’ The New York Times, December 8, 2010, accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/12/09/opinion/09thu1.html.
117 Official, Regulatory Agency for Charitable Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
118 See Law no. 15 2014; Emiri Decree no. 43 2014; Emiri Decree no. 55 2014; Ministerial Decision no. 5 2015.
119 ‘lncrease and develop awareness of charity work within the community’, Regulatory Authority for Charitable 
Activities, 2016.
120 Hukoomi, 7/11/2016‘Charity Work - Hukoomi - Qatar E-Government,’ accessed October 2, 2016,
http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/topics/Family,+Community+and+Religion/Charity+Work.
121 Official, Regulatory Agency for Charitable Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
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Implementing ‘a regular audit on all the managerial and financial operations related to 
all entities involved in the charity field in the State of Qatar’124 is an immense effort for a 
handful of persons to handle; and was still expressed as a ‘wish’ by one of its managers in 
February 2016.125
 Hence, if reforms are adopted with ease when state interests and international 
demands match, their daily implementation is often still partial.126 Thus while no aid 
actor has been able to resist the implementation of QACA and its successor, RACA, 
the regulatory agencies’ have never benefited from full-fledged mandates, nor from the 
automatic acquiescence and cooperation of all national stakeholders. 
Conclusion
A historical-institutional reading shows how the growth and consolidation of the rentier 
state enabled aid initiatives to flourish and prosper to the detriment of aid cohesion. 
The more the rentier state grew, and the ruling circle consolidated, the more its actors 
fragmented along different lines. In the case of foreign aid, the traditional versus 
professional, the isolated versus the connected, the indolent versus the proactive, were 
always two sides of the same, rentier, coin. 
 The rentier state locked-in initial institutional designs in ways that resist rulers’ 
reforms and international pressure. Therefore, if the bright side of Qatar’s foreign aid is 
that (contrary to some ‘branding’ accounts) there is an impetus within the principality 
for a more integrated aid system, the downside is that small states like Qatar cannot 
escape the constraints of the ossified bureaucracies of their larger rentier neighbours. 
Such bureaucratic change, despite the state’s size and autocratic regime, is bound to 
come at ‘a much slower pace than the rise of the skyscrapers.’127
122 RACA however is also responsible for providing licenses for domestic fundraising activities, whether these have 
domestic or external goals. These fundraising campaigns should not exceed three months. RACA Facebook Page, 
July 6, 2015.
123 Official, Regulatory Agency for Charitable Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
124 ‘lncrease and develop awareness of charity work within the community’, Regulatory Authority for Charitable 
Activities, 2016.
125 Official, Regulatory Agency for Charitable Affairs. Interview by author. Doha, February 3, 2016.
126 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 225.
127 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 4.
